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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
 
PARTICIPATION IN AGRICULTURAL GOVERNMENTAL COST SHARE 
PROGRAMS IN THE KENTUCKY RIVER WATERSHED 
 
 
The purpose of this study is to review existing literature of factors that influence farmers’ 
decision to participate in conservation programs.  This study is also intended to collect 
county data and information on conservation programs and participation in the Kentucky 
River watershed region, which can be analyzed and used to draw differences in 
characteristics of the region that would suggest willingness to participate in a trading scheme 
for improvements in water quality. 
 The results suggest that more participation in a trading scheme from some counties 
than others should be expected.  Counties with more farms and larger farms will probably 
have higher rates of participation in conservation programs. 
 The cost-share amounts being paid by current government programs must be 
considered as the minimum staring point to negotiate in a trading scheme.  To target the 
impact of watersheds, such as the Kentucky River in the Mississippi system, that discharges 
significant amounts of pollutants into the Gulf of Mexico, policy makers and program 
administrators should be advising and stimulating the adoption of practices with the best 
abatement performance for such pollutants considering technical complementarity between 
practices. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 The market for water pollution allowances could reduce costs of water pollution 
mitigation, and increase efforts on reducing discharges of pollutants in the Kentucky River 
Watershed.  The intent of this study is to identify characteristics of farmer's, located in the 
area of the Kentucky River Watershed that explains their participation in government 
conservation programs.  Therefore, suggest successful strategies to help create a permit 
market for water pollution allowances in the Kentucky River Watershed. 
 In order to mitigate the pollution in the Kentucky River Watershed and subsequently 
help achieve major reductions in pollution in the Gulf of Mexico region at low costs, a 
market based program, Water Quality Trading (WQT) Policy, is being advised by the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA, 2003) to the state of Kentucky.  This 
strategy, although encouraged throughout the country, is far from being successful in 
achieving reduced costs and in lowering pollution due to low participation of stakeholders 
(Breetz et al., 2004).  Therefore, the need of understanding stakeholders’ concerns and 
actions in order to engage in conservation programs is important.  
 The Kentucky River watershed carries significant quantities of nutrients and 
sediment into the Ohio River basin, which is one of the sub-basins that contribute to the 
discharge of these pollutants to the Gulf of Mexico.  This interaction contributes to a 
hypoxic zone in the gulf, an oxygen-depleted area that cannot support aquatic life.  The 
WQT Policy is being primarily targeted to access the Nitrogen (N) and Phosphorus (P) 
pollution in this Kentucky watershed region.  Industry, commercial facilities, municipal water 
treatment facilities for example are major contributors to this pollution, and commonly 
identified as point sources (PS) of pollution.  In addition, agriculture and silviculture are also 
examples of nutrient pollution sources, and are commonly identified as nonpoint sources 
(NPS) of pollution. 
 Robust participation by agriculture in a trading program can overcome challenges in 
programs that might lack the authority or incentives to engage producers in water quality 
initiatives (Rowles, 2005).  To assist in understanding if an economic incentive approach 
would be feasible in the state of Kentucky, specifically in the Kentucky River Watershed, 
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information on participation of conservation programs in the state can help identify 
characteristics that explain farmers and landowner’s willingness in participating in a WQT 
program.  Information in the area of the Kentucky River Watershed on selected 
socioeconomic characteristics, county farmland uses, as well as mechanisms of 
communication and outreach with farmers that tend to reduce mistrust in program 
administrators, will be assessed to understand the likelihood of voluntary adoption decision 
of conservation programs. 
 The first objective of this study is to review existing literature that examines farmer 
adoption of conservation practices.  In particular, the interest of this study will be in the 
review of studies that specifically address factors that influence farmer’s decision to 
participate on public conservation programs. 
 The second objective is to review existing literature and identify what potential 
problems exist when instituting a WQT.  Factors identified in the literature can potentially 
explain farmers' behavior in adopting conservation practices, and their participation in 
conservation programs.  The characteristics of farmers that participate in conservation 
programs could predict WQT participation in the Kentucky River watershed.  Using 
secondary data, one can identify counties within the Kentucky River watershed that may 
have the characteristics that may predict a higher rate of participation in Water Quality 
trading scheme then others. 
 The third objective is to collect county data and information on conservation 
programs and participation in the Kentucky River watershed region, which can be analyzed 
and used to draw differences in characteristics in the forty-six counties that would suggest 
willingness to participate in a trading scheme for improvements in water quality. 
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Chapter 2. Background 
 
2.1.   Market Incentives for a Water Quality Trading – Historical and theoretical 
assessment 
 
 The right to use a resource relates to property rights as first propounded in a paper 
by Ronald Coase (1960).  Coase observed that it is more cost-effective to install private 
property rights and make them transferable to let a market determine their price, rather than 
to impose general limits on pollution, or fixing a price by installing environmental taxes.  
The general model of tradable property rights, and the idea that markets of pollution rights 
are an alternative policy instrument to pollution taxes as a way of achieving a target 
reduction in pollution, was historically proposed a few years later by Thomas D. Crocker 
(1966) for air emissions and by John H. Dales (1968) for water pollution. 
 The market treats as demand for the rights of pollution permits the marginal 
abatement cost curve of each polluter.  The demand for pollution permits can be higher or 
lower depending on the effectiveness of each polluter.  If each permit to pollute is seen as 
needed for each unit of pollution to be discharged, then a regulatory authority can issue a 
total number of permits.  That total number of permits represents the total emissions that 
the regulatory entity considers optimal in a given area, for a given pollutant, for a period of 
time. 
 Polluters may purchase each permit at a given price, which will allow them to emit an 
amount of pollution.  However, if it is cheaper to abate pollution rather than buying permits, 
then a polluter may consider it is less costly to abate and sell permits.  If it is cheaper to buy 
permits than to abate pollution, then that polluter will have a demand for permits.  The 
market exchange of these permits among polluters will lead to a cost minimization in 
reducing a unit of pollution.  Once the market is established, new entrants will either buy 
permits from holders of existing permits, or they will invest in pollution control equipment.  
If the regulatory authority wishes to restrict even further the overall pollution, at a future 
time, they will issue less permits to reflect the new pollution standard that they wish to 
impose (Pearce & Turner, 1990). 
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 The emission permit system is illustrated in Figure 1, assuming two different sources 
of pollution.  The marginal cost of pollution control for the second source (C) is higher than 
the first source (A). Hence, both sources have an incentive to trade.  The second source can 
lower its costs from buying a permit from the first source at a price lower than C.  This will 
be advantageous for the first source if it could sell a permit for a price higher than A.  Trades 
of permits will occur until the marginal value of a permit for both sources (B) is reached, and 
there will be no more incentives to trade. 
 
Figure 1.1. Cost-effectiveness and the emission permit system 
Source: Tietenberg, Thomas H. (2006) 
 The Tar-Pamlico in North Carolina and the Dillon Lake in the Colorado are some of 
the oldest WQT projects in the U.S.  These existing programs were designed such that PS 
polluters purchase emissions allowances from NPS polluters.  The amount of allowances 
purchased depends on the amount of expected runoff to be reduced by NPS polluters.  
Under existing programs, expected runoff reductions from NPS in the basin occur through 
installation of best-management practices (BMPs) and the development of nutrient 
management plans.  Under certain conditions, the determined price provides the correct 
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incentive for dischargers to arrange emissions levels such that a cost-minimizing solution is 
reached.  For example, costs of reducing agricultural NPS loads in a watershed may be less 
than reducing PS loads, especially if PS discharges are already being constrained by a permit 
program that controls water pollution by regulating PS that discharge pollutants into waters, 
such as the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) of the Clean Water 
Act (US EPA, 2003). 
 First suggested in the 1960s by economists considering how society could achieve 
long-term reductions in pollution, without causing an undue burden on the economy, the 
trading scheme allows polluters to re-allocate the right to pollute and decide who actually 
does the pollution abatement.  Those with high costs of abatement pollute more and abate 
less, and those with low costs pollute less and abate more.  To achieve an efficient reduction 
of N and P pollution required by regulations, the installation of BMPs and/or development 
of nutrient management plans by sources of pollution can create permits (rights) for 
pollution emissions that could be traded (sold to) with less efficient sources of pollution. 
 
2.2.   The Gulf of Mexico Hypoxic zone 
 
 The Upper Mississippi, Ohio, and Lower Mississippi River sub-basins discharge 
significant quantities of nutrients and sediment to the Gulf of Mexico contributing to the 
hypoxic zone, an oxygen-depleted area that cannot support aquatic life.  The hypoxic zone in 
the northern Gulf of Mexico refers to an area along the Louisiana-Texas coast, and is the 
second largest hypoxic zone worldwide.  Nutrient over-enrichment from anthropogenic 
sources is one of the major stresses impacting coastal ecosystems.  The excess nutrients and 
sediments come from a wide range of PS and NPS, including runoff from atmospheric 
deposition, urbanized land, soil erosion, agricultural fertilizers, animal feeding facilities, 
municipal sewage treatment outfalls, and industrial discharges (EPA 2002).  Figures 2.1 and 
2.2 depict maps of the influence of discharges from the Mississippi’s basin system and the 
Gulf of Mexico hypoxic zone, one of the largest in the world. 
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Figure 2.1. The Mississippi River Basin System 
Source: US EPA 
Figure 2.2. Gulf of Mexico hypoxic zone 
Source: NOAA Satellite and Information System 
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 Market-based approaches, such as water quality trading, that use innovative 
programs for trading private property rights to reduce pollution emissions, have the potential 
to accelerate the restoration of the Gulf of Mexico.  Have also the potential to improve the 
overall quality of water bodies along the Mississippi’s basin system, such as the Kentucky 
River Watershed in the state of Kentucky, and help achieve pollution reduction at lower total 
costs.  Setting pollutant reduction targets and allowing sources to buy and sell credits to meet 
those targets can make pollution reduction faster, easier, and cheaper to meet water quality 
standards. 
 The initial intent of a Water Quality Trading program is for NPS (agriculture) to 
supply cost-effective nutrient reductions in lieu of anticipated PS loading associated with 
urban and industrial sources.  As agriculture is a major NPS in the whole basin system that 
impacts the Gulf hypoxic zone, including the Kentucky River Watershed (EPA 2002), it is 
envisioned that trading opportunities in a water quality market with significant demand will 
motivate producers to participate in such program.  Robust participation by agriculture in a 
trading program can overcome common challenges in traditional programs that lack the 
authority or incentives to engage producers in water quality initiatives (Rowles 2005). 
 A market driver on a possible Water Quality Trading program in the Kentucky River 
Watershed is the difference between the current amount of discharge, and the targeted 
discharge amount.  Permits will give the targeted discharge amount for PS.  The Kentucky 
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (KPDES) could set these permits.  Buyers are those 
who have to meet the lower pollutant effluent limits than their current discharge, required by 
the KPDES.  Sellers are those who have less discharge to the watershed than their allocated 
permits; in other words, sellers will have an “over control” or water quality credits.  As a 
result, the product to be traded on the proposed market will be the over control generated 
by sellers.  If sufficient trading potential exists within a watershed, the buyers may be able to 
lower their cost of reducing discharge by the cheaper option of purchasing water quality 
credits from the sellers. 
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2.3.   KY WQT drivers 
 
 Information from the KPDES shows that there are 256 municipal PS, 7,156 
industrial PS, and 2,284 permits for private and commercial PS of discharges in the state of 
Kentucky with 1,217 total sources in the Kentucky River Watershed.  These data 
demonstrate the initial potential for demand for trading within the state.  Moreover, available 
information from the KPDES program, on the Kentucky Division of Water 2004 Report to 
Congress on Water Quality (305[b] Report) shows that there are 1477.2 river miles affected 
by agricultural sources of discharge, 924.7 river miles affected by Resource extraction, 721.3 
river miles affected by Urban runoff/storm sewers, 1,059.2 river miles affected by habitat 
modification, and other sources such as hydro modification, inappropriate waste 
disposal/wildcat dumping, silviculture, septic disposal, spills, natural and unknown sources 
that account for 2,496.9 river miles affected.  These NPS represent a potential for adoption 
of BMPs and the development of nutrient management plans to preserve water quality while 
maintaining the economic value of Kentucky's land resources. 
 
2.3.1.   Federal Regulations 
 
 The Clean Water Act (CWA) establishes the basic structure for regulating PS 
discharges of pollutants into the waters of the United States.  Under the CWA, EPA has 
implemented pollution control programs such as setting wastewater standards for the 
industry.  It has also set water quality standards for all contaminants in surface waters.  
Furthermore, the CWA made it unlawful to discharge any pollutant from a PS into navigable 
waters, unless a permit was obtained from EPA's NPDES (KPDES) permit program that 
controls discharges.  PS are defined as discrete conveyances such as pipes or man-made 
ditches.  Individual homes that are connected to a municipal system, use a septic system, or 
do not have a surface discharge do not need an NPDES (KPDES) permit; however, 
industrial, municipal, and other facilities must obtain permits if their discharges go directly to 
surface waters.  By issuing permits, the authority or regulator allocates rights for emissions 
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that will reduce current pollution, and will create a demand for permits for those PS that are 
less efficient in an existent pollution trading scheme. 
 
2.3.2.   State Regulations 
 
 In order to protect surface and groundwater resources from pollution as a result of 
agriculture and forestry (silviculture) activities, the Agriculture Water Quality Act (AWQA) 
was created.  The AWQA is the Kentucky’s water quality legislation, that was also created to 
develop and improve BMPs in conservation plans, to develop statewide and regional 
agricultural water quality plans, and to promote soil and water conservation activities.  The 
AWQA requires all landowners, with 10 or more acres being used for agriculture or 
silviculture operations, to develop and implement a water quality plan based upon its state 
plan guidance.  And according to the AWQA, it is the sole responsibility of each of these 
landowners and farm operators to develop and implement a water quality plan for their 
individual operations (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.71-100). 
 Although the AWQA legislation forces NPS to comply with the regulations, 
implementing conservation plans, there are no standards of water pollution based on NPS 
pollution subject to penalties.  This makes the process of creating a WQT system more 
complicated because the property rights of pollution are not well defined for the NPS.  
Nonetheless, one can still estimate the NPS current discharges of N and P pollutants, and 
conceptualize a possible scenario for WQT scheme for the Kentucky River Watershed. 
 
2.3.3.   Incentives to comply with regulations - conservation cost-share programs 
 
 To help landowners and farmers adjust their operations and cope with costs of 
compliance to adopt new technologies to prevent pollution, several government 
conservation programs from different agencies are in place and can help with the adoption 
of the water quality plans.  Government conservation programs can provide financial 
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incentives for farmers' participation on voluntary pollution control, having the potential for 
significant cost savings when implementing conservation practices (Batte and Bacon 1995).  
An overview of existing programs offered to NPS, mainly agriculture and silviculture, and its 
related agencies and the nature of each program, is provided in Table 2.1.  In this study, a 
combination of these programs was tested to offer insight of farmers’ compliance with state 
regulations, and their participation in conservation activities. 
 One of the programs is the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), a 
voluntary based program that offers technical assistance and financial payments through up 
to seventy five percent (75%) of cost-share contracts, for implementing conservation 
practices (BMPs), to livestock, agricultural production, and nonindustrial private forestland.  
This program is offered through the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) of 
the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), and its contracts generally last from 
one year after the last conservation practice is implemented to a maximum term of ten years.  
Also offered through the same agency is the Wildlife Habitat Incentive Program (WHIP), 
which only differs from EQIP on its eligibility criterion of allowing conservation-minded 
landowners who want to develop and improve fish and wildlife habitat on agricultural land, 
nonindustrial private forestland, and tribal land (USDA NRCS Programs). 
 Another program tested is the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), which is a 
program established by the USDA in 1985 that takes land prone to erosion out of 
production for 10 to 15 years and devotes it to conservation uses.  In return, farmers under 
CRP receive an annual per-acre rent and half the costs of establishing an approved 
permanent land cover, in exchange for retiring highly erodible or other environmentally 
sensitive cropland for 10-15 years.  The CRP is basically a land retirement program that 
converts cropland into grasslands or forestlands.  The program is funded through the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), administered by the Farm Service Agency (FSA), 
with NRCS providing technical land eligibility determinations, conservation planning and 
practice implementation (USDA NRCS Programs). 
 The Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP), the Farmable Wetlands Program (FWP) and 
the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) are programs included under the 
CRP program. These programs are voluntary, have specific land eligibility requirements, and 
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offer landowners financial incentives for conservation practices.  The CREP is a land 
retirement program administered by USDA's FSA.  By combining CRP resources, the CREP 
targets conservation limited to specific geographic areas.  Also administered by the FSA, The 
FWP is targeted to producers in all states to restore up to one million acres of farmable 
wetlands and associated buffers by improving the land’s hydrology and vegetation.  Under 
FWP Producers must plant long-term, resource-conserving covers to improve the quality of 
water, control soil erosion and enhance wildlife habitat on land enrolled in CRP.  In return, 
FSA provides FWP participants with rental payments and cost-share assistance, and its 
contract duration lasts between 10 and 15 years.  The WRP is a conservation easement or a 
cost-share restoration agreement with the USDA State of Kentucky NRCS, which benefits 
wetlands on landowners’ property.  Under WRP, Landowners can choose between 
agreements of permanent easements, 30-year easements, and restoration cost-share 
agreements that can last at least 10 years (USDA NRCS Programs). 
 The conservation practices supported by the several conservation programs can also 
generate NPS credits under WQT programs.  In some cases such as the reduction of N and 
P pollution, WQT schemes can be an alternative to programs that cannot cover specific 
pollution standards.  WQT schemes not only have the potential to reduce costs of 
compliance from regulations, but also reduce farmers’ dependency on government financial 
assistance. 
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Table 2.1. Summary of Conservation Programs offered in Kentucky 
  Program Type Goals Mechanisms Eligibility Length 
1 Environmental 
Quality Incen-
tives Program 
(EQIP) - NRCS 
Voluntary fi-
nancial assis-
tance program 
Achieve environmental 
objectives- Improve water 
quality 
Payments to implement 
conservation practices 
(BMPs) 
Livestock; agricul-
tural production; 
non-industrial pri-
vate; and forestland  
Up to 10 years 
       
2 Conservation Re-
serve Program 
(CRP) - FSA 
Voluntary 
land retire-
ment program 
Conversion: cropland into 
grasslands or forest lands 
Receive annual rental 
payments; and Cost-
share assistance for up to 
50 % of the costs in es-
tablishing approved con-
servation practices - long
-term resource conserv-
ing covers on eligible 
farmland 
Agricultural land-
owners; and certain 
marginal pastureland 
(Rip. Buffers) 
Contracts last for 10 
to 15 years 
       
3 Wildlife Habitat 
Incentive Pro-
gram (WHIP) - 
NRCS 
Voluntary fi-
nancial assis-
tance program 
Develop and improve 
wildlife habitat - Upland, 
wetland, aquatic and other 
types 
Technical assistance and 
up to 75% cost-share 
assistance 
Private and tribal 
landowners 
Contracts/
agreements last 1 
year after the last 
conservation prac-
tice (BMPs) 
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Table 2.1. Summary of Conservation Programs offered in Kentucky (Cont.) 
  Program Type Goals Mechanisms Eligibility Length 
4 Conservation 
Stewardship Pro-
gram (CSP) - 
NRCS 
Voluntary fi-
nancial assis-
tance program 
Undertake additional con-
servation activities; con-
serve and enhance soil, 
water, air, and related 
natural resources 
Annual land use pay-
ments based on conser-
vation performance; and 
supplemental payment 
for the adoption of re-
source-conserving crop 
rotations 
Tribal agricultural 
land; private agricul-
tural land; non-
industrial private for-
est lands 
*Contracts/
agreements last 1 
year after the last 
conservation prac-
tice (BMPs) 
       
5 Grassland Re-
serve Program 
(GRP) - NRCS 
Voluntary 
rental contract 
(conservation 
easement) 
Preservation and restora-
tion of native grasslands; 
supporting grazing opera-
tions; protecting grass-
lands from threats of con-
version; maintaining and 
improving plant and ani-
mal biodiversity 
Determined by the low-
est of an appraisal, geo-
graphic area rate cap, or 
landowner offer; pay a 
flat rate per acre for the 
grassland value for each 
year of the agreement; 
covers the cost of the 
appraisal, land surveys, 
closing and recording 
fees 
Landowners and op-
erators 
10, 15, 20 years or 
permanent  
       
6 Wetlands Reserve 
Program (WRP) - 
NRCS 
Voluntary 
technical and 
financial assis-
tance 
Protect, restore, and en-
hance wetlands 
Conservation easement; 
and cost-share restora-
tion agreement 
Landowners Permanent ease-
ments; 30-year ease-
ments; restoration 
cost-share agree-
ments of a mini-
mum 10-year dura-
tion 
Source: USDA (FSA; NRCS); Kentucky Division of Conservation and Division of Water  
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2.4.   WQT most common uncertainty issues 
 
 Even though the federal and state incentives are in place to contribute to the 
adoption of conservation practices on agriculture land in the state of Kentucky, conservation 
measures can still create greater uncertainty about future productivity and profitability 
(McSweeny and Kramer 1986).  Farmers are averse to introducing more uncertainty and 
vulnerability because their economic survival is already subject to a complex series of factors.  
When farmers make decisions about farm management and conservation practices, such the 
changes in weather patterns and markets, they might face substantial capital costs for new 
equipment and opportunity costs, associated with taking land out of production or devoting 
time to new practices. 
 
2.4.1.   Stakeholders low participation in the U.S. WQT initiatives 
 
 WQT has been applied for more than 20 years in the US (Breetz et al., 2004; Morgan 
and Wolverton, 2005), but the great majority of WQT programs have not been very 
successful.  The results of the WQT initiatives including non-point sources are mixed, if not 
negative, taking in consideration that few of the US initiatives have actually generated more 
than a few trades (Woodward et al., 2002; Breetz et al., 2004; Morgan and Wolverton, 2005).  
The examples considered successful were in terms of the implementation of the structure of 
the programs, but have not succeeded on trading volumes. 
 Also according to Breetz et al. (2004) survey of all WQT programs in the United 
States, between all the 40 WQT programs identified, only 12 allow the inclusion of 
agricultural NPS.  From the remaining 28 programs, some are non-agricultural NPS, some 
other programs intend to include farmers but have not yet developed a trading framework, 
and for some programs the inclusion of NPS is not allowed.  Many of the 12 WQT 
programs that included agriculture NPS in U.S. have yet to see a single trade, they range 
from small pilots exploring the feasibility of trading, to sole-source offsets in which a single 
PS negotiated a permit that included trading, to large programs providing multiple PS with 
NPS credits. 
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 It was found that the main barriers for the participation of farmers are the lack of 
awareness of these systems, the lack of science, and no trust in program administrators 
(Breetz et al., 2005).  When approached with the ideas of WQT, farmers fear they will lose 
autonomy in their farm operations, they also fear increased government oversight, and they 
may resent the fact of being portrayed as polluters, because they view themselves as stewards 
of the land and that they have a strong conservation ethic.  Farmers also express their 
resentment towards urbanites.  They were reluctant to participate in some WQT programs 
involving municipalities because they perceived their participation as an indirect way to fund 
urban growth (Breetz et al., 2005). 
 Effective stakeholder involvement provides a method for identifying public concerns 
and values, developing consensus among affected parties, producing efficient and effective 
solutions through an open and inclusive process.  Involving stakeholders builds trust and 
support for the process and product, shares responsibility for decisions or actions, creates 
solutions more likely to be adopted, leads to better, more cost-effective solutions, forges 
stronger working relationships, enhances communication and coordination of resources, and 
contributes to design parameters that mitigate uncertainty, market distortions, and political 
transactions (Rowles 2005).  Moreover, each stakeholder group is unique, and its makeup 
and operation will depend on several factors such as the driving forces of the effort, the 
agencies’ internal goals, and the geographic scale, the time frame needed for decision making, 
the available budget, and the political climate.  Before forming a stakeholder group, all of 
these factors must be considered to determine the best way to proceed in considering a 
WQT system. 
 Despite of none or low volume of trading, the programs were initiated by 
stakeholder coalitions.  Past studies and the EPA, identifies the involvement of stakeholders 
as one of the primary objectives for the success in the development of WQT.  Therefore, 
supplying cost-effective pollutant reductions in lieu of anticipated PS loadings, associated 
with urban and industrial sources. 
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2.4.2.   Trading ratios 
 
 There is a greater uncertainty in the determination of loads and load reductions in 
trades that involve nonpoint sources due to factors such as the variability in precipitation, 
variable performance of BMPs, and the effect of soils, cover and slope.  The fate and 
transport characteristics of pollutants also add uncertainty.  For example, a pound of P 
discharged upstream may not arrive as a pound of P at a downstream point due to diversions, 
sediment deposition, or assimilation by plants.  Other factors to consider in trading 
programs include providing incentives for achieving early loading reductions prior to 
development of a permit and achieving nonpoint source loading reductions in the absence of 
any regulatory requirements. 
 One method to address these factors is to use a trading ratio that is greater that 1:1 
between nonpoint and point sources.  A trading ratio is the ratio of the mass of pollutant 
reduced using a BMP to the mass of pollutant that would need to be reduced at a treatment 
plant through plant upgrades.  For example, a trading ratio of 2:1 means that a BMP would 
have to remove 2 pounds of P for a treatment plant to receive credit for 1 pound of P 
reduction.  It is possible that due to the geographic complexity of the watershed and 
pollutant fate and transport characteristics, it may be difficult to establish very precise 
trading ratios between all pairs of buyers/sellers. 
 Specifically, to determine trade ratios, one or more of the following factors, 
whenever applicable, may be included: 
 Equivalency: Factor applied to pollutant reduction credits to adjust for trading 
different pollutants or different forms of the same pollutant; 
 Distance: Factor applied to pollutant reduction credits when sources are directly 
discharging to a water body of concern that accounts for the distance and unique 
watershed features (e.g., hydrologic conditions) that will affect pollutant fate and 
transport between trading partners; 
 Location: Factor applied to pollutant reduction credits when sources are upstream of 
a water body of concern that accounts for the distance and unique watershed 
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features between a pollutant source and the downstream water body (e.g., bay, 
estuary, lake, reservoir) or area of interest (e.g., a hypoxic zone in a water body); 
 Uncertainty: Factor applied to pollutant reduction credits generated by nonpoint 
sources that accounts for lack of information and risk associated with best 
management practice measurement, implementation and performance; and/or 
 Retirement: Factor applied to pollutant reduction credits to accelerate water quality 
improvement.  The ratio indicates the proportion of credits that must be purchased 
in addition to the credits needed to meet regulatory obligations.  These excess credits 
are taken out of circulation (retired) to accelerate water quality improvement. 
 To address uncertainty and equivalence, Wisconsin used a formula to calculate site 
specific trade ratios based on factors such as: is the trade in a targeted area; is the BMP in the 
same watershed; how close is the BMP to the point source; is the BMP upstream or 
downstream of the PS (Breetz et al., 2004).  Michigan’s approach to uncertainty and 
equivalence is different. Its rules require that a set percentage of loading reductions be 
contributed to the State to address uncertainty and to provide a net water quality benefit 
(Breetz et al., 2004).  For PS reductions, the rule requires a 10 percent contribution, which is 
equivalent to a 1.11:1 trading ratio.  NPS reductions require a 50 percent contribution, which 
is equivalent to a 2:1 trading ratio. Additional discounts are applied to the use of credits in 
certain situations to address equivalence. 
 For WQT systems that involve NPS and that target N and P pollution, the 
uncertainty due to a trading ratio and the methods used to define it, greatly influence the 
decision of stakeholder’s involvement.  Therefore, a reliably estimated ratio for pollution 
emission trades should improve with information from GIS models, local and state 
stakeholder databases, EPA regional offices, and literature reporting trading ratios in 
comparable regions. 
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2.5.   WQT unintended consequences 
 
 Since trading, in effect, allows point sources to discharge above their base effluent 
limits, it has the potential to cause adverse local water quality impacts.  Where necessary, 
NPDES (KPDES) permits and the trading mechanism should include provisions that limit 
trading to ensure that adverse local impacts do not occur.  There is always risk of 
catastrophic failure, whether traditional regulations are used or whether trading markets are 
used.  In the case of water quality, a catastrophic risk such as a spill, or an exceptionally large 
release of nutrients or chemicals into a waterway, are not inherently larger with a trading 
program.  This need not change with pollution trading.  There is no reason why safeguards 
against spills (i.e. fines and other penalties) cannot be used in combination with a trading 
program to minimize the possibility of a spill, or in the case of an actual spill, to help pay for 
the cleanup. 
 A challenge for trading programs, are “hotspots” such as a stream segment below 
the outfall for a wastewater treatment plant has worse water quality than the stream 
segments above it (or below the hotspot).  To address this possibility, monitoring data, 
trading ratios and temporal or regional limits on trades should be proposed.  These three 
approaches are not mutually exclusive and can be adopted at the same time. 
 Monitoring data should be used to verify the location of a hotspot, which requires 
the permitting authority and the trading authority (if there is any) to examine water quality 
data on a regular basis to predict the occurrence of a hotspot, based on their best knowledge.  
This may include modeling and data assessment and determine the availability of assimilative 
capacity for the pollutant.  The presence of low flow areas, impoundments or other 
environmental factors that would cause the pollutant to persist longer in the water stream 
should also be considered.  Mitigation methods should only be imposed if the regulators can 
verify, with data, that hotspots actually exist or is unavoidable without the mitigation.  For 
example, if a hotspot is identified below a particular plant, then regulators may want to limit 
trading entirely or they may want to impose a fairly strict trading ratio for that plant alone.  
For water quality trading, monitoring data closely will increase the cost of operation but this 
type of monitoring is essential. 
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 Trading ratios can be an effective way avoiding local impacts.  Regulators can adjust 
trading ratios to encourage and discourage certain trades.  The possibility varying trading 
ratios should be accommodated by the trading mechanism.  An accompanying approach 
regulators may use is to place a cap on the portion of its effluent limit that a point source can 
replace with credits purchased from other dischargers through trading. 
 Temporal limits would be appropriate if, for instance, phosphorous is found to be 
causing the nonattainment problem during low flow periods.  If this is truly the case, then 
regulators can write NPDES (KPDES) permits that make a distinction between high and 
low flow periods (i.e. winter and summer months), and that allow firms to use nonpoint 
source pollution credits only during certain months of the year. Water quality authority and 
trade monitoring authority may also impose regional restrictions of trade, for example 
allowing only upstream trades.  A program design where buyers (PS) can purchase credits 
only from upstream NPS is a protective limitation of water quality downstream of the point 
source.  Economically, the limitation for upstream credit purchases has two major 
ramifications for the trading program.  First, credit supply and demand becomes localized.  
In other words, any geographic location in the watershed has its own credit market and all 
the local markets on the same stream are interconnected.  Second, point sources located in 
the upstream (headwater) areas of the watershed could be in a more competitive market for 
credits because as one moves upstream, potential credit supply diminishes. 
 For a successful implementation of a WQT system, a feasibility study including 
estimated costs of data monitoring, considering the change of trading ratios, the long-term 
sustainability of the market, and considering implications of certain policies should be 
conducted avoiding serious undesired consequences such as “hotspots”. 
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Chapter 3.  Literature Review of farmers’ participation in conservation programs 
 
3.1.   Previous studies 
 
 The success of the current incentives from government conservation programs, such 
as CRP, given to farmers to address pollution abatement can be applied to market based 
mechanisms, such as WQT schemes.  There are a variety of studies that discuss the adoption 
of conservation practices through conservation programs, its effectiveness, the participation 
decision of landowners, farmers and other stakeholders.  Although adoption of conservation 
practices does not directly relates to participation in a WQT scheme, it could be useful to 
identify certain factors which could be relevant in determining farmer decision in addressing 
the use of technologies that reduce pollution.  Understanding the use of conservation 
practices, also known as BMPs, are important to establish a connection between the decision 
in addressing pollution abatement and the effectiveness of the current incentives being used. 
 There are a number of studies that relate the decision to adopt conservation practices, 
or BMPs, with specific farmer characteristics and land uses.  For example, Lynch and Lovell 
(2003) discuss the factors influencing participation in farmland preservation programs, 
specifically on both purchase of development rights and transfer of development rights.  
With a survey of 836 farmland owners from certain counties in the state of Maryland, they 
found that the farmers' willingness in engaging in a preservation program, increases with 
farm size, growing crops, farm soils eligibility, the share of income from farming, and if a 
child plans to continue farming.  They also found that if farmers' own land closer to the 
nearest city, they are less likely to join a preservation program. 
 Using farmers' characteristics, Breetz et al. (2005) conduct a study analyzing how 
water quality trading programs in U.S. are related to communication mechanisms.  From 12 
case studies of WQT programs in the U.S. that involved agricultural NPS, they conclude that 
by incorporating trusted social relations into water quality trading program such as, 
trustworthy third parties intermediaries or existing relationships, with education and 
outreach programs, could reduce farmers’ reluctance to participate in conservation programs. 
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 In a survey made to Louisiana dairy farmers, about their characteristics and the uses 
of their land parcels, Paudel et al. (2008) assess the impact of socioeconomic attributes on 
the BMPs adoption decision, relative to cost-share and fixed incentive payments.  Their 
analysis of the steps in the adoption decision process of BMPs indicated, that visits between 
the producers and the U.S. Department of Agriculture–Natural Resource Conservation 
Service significantly increase likelihood of BMP adoption, and that the low cost-share 
percentage offered by the EQIP tends to reduce farmers’ adoption of conservation practices. 
Producer willingness-to-pay results indicate that marginal increases in dairy BMP adoption 
and associated improvement in environmental quality require increased technical and 
financial assistance.  The study also indicated that farmers with a higher level of education 
attainment, and with lower debt-to-asset ratio, tend to be more likely prone in adopting in 
certain conservation practices. 
 Rahelizatovo and Gillespie (2004), examine Louisiana dairy producers’ decision 
adoption of BMPs in terms of the total number of practices implemented up to a certain 
period.  Their results emphasize that producers' would adopt greater number of technologies 
depending on the information about their awareness of stricter regulations to control water 
pollution from NPS, their dairy production performance and profitability, the size of their 
dairy production plant, their risk aversion behavior, having constant contact with 
Cooperative Extension Service personal, and have a stream running through their properties.  
On the other hand, the greater the percentage of land owned, and the age of the farmer 
negatively affects the number of BMPs adopted. 
 Ghazalian et al. (2009) from a survey on local farmers from Chaudièrie Watershed 
region in Quebec, Canada, also investigate the determinants affecting producers’ adoption of 
some BMPs.  Education, gender, age, belonging to an agro-environment club, and on-farm 
residence are found to have significant effects on the adoption of some BMPs.  Farms with 
larger animal production would be more apt to implement manure management practices, 
crop rotation, and riparian buffer strips.  Also, farms with larger cultivated acres would be 
more inclined to implement herbicide control practices, crop rotation, and riparian buffer 
strips.  The price of labor has a negative impact on the implementation of crop rotation 
cycles, but a positive impact implementing manure management practices. 
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 Suter et al. (2008) analyze participation in land retirement programs, in the binary-
choice setting of the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP), using data from 
218 counties in six states.  Their results suggest that landowners react positively to the 
incentives that are offered from the program.  The results also suggests that increases in one-
time incentives, offered at the time of signup, are a more cost-effective means to increase 
enrollment than increases in the incentives offered on an annual basis. 
 With an empirical study, Chouinard et al. (2008) hypothesize that there are farmers 
that are willing to forego some profit to voluntary engage in farm practices without 
monetary incentives.  Using a Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), they provide evidence 
that some farmers are willing to make this sacrifice.  Their independent variables include the 
bid amount the producer is responding to, and producer characteristics.  The dependent 
variable is a response for each bid amount associated with an increased level of stewardship. 
 Kurkalova et al. (2006) propose a method of directly estimating the financial 
incentives required for adopting conservation tillage, and distinguishing between the 
expected payoff and premium of adoption based on the observed behavior.  Their method 
finds that the premium may play a significant role in farmers’ adoption decisions.  Applying 
the method to the state of Iowa, they find that if a uniform conservation tillage adoption 
subsidy program were offered in 1992, over 86% of the subsidy program payments would be 
an income transfer to existing and low-cost adopters. 
 Examining the effects of land use policies on watershed ecosystems through their 
effect on land use, Langpap et al. (2008) study results suggest that land use policies based on 
monetary incentives and property acquisition programs, can have relatively large positive 
impacts on watershed health, while policies that change the returns to land use are less 
effective.  Their results also suggest that there is potential for targeting these policies because 
their impacts vary across watersheds with different land use mixes. 
 Other than the categories of research on the adoption decision of conservation 
practices and the participation decision to the incentives offered to farmers, there is the 
study of Paudel et al. (2003) that investigated the environmental impacts of alternative 
agricultural practices, within a watershed under different water quality standards.  Their 
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results indicated that stricter environmental standards lower total profit potential and litter 
utilization. 
 Understanding the factors that influence participation in voluntary programs is 
important when evaluating existing programs and determining new conditions for those 
programs as well as when developing new programs.  Land uses and farm characteristics, as 
well as community characteristics are relevant if one wants to determine the probability that 
farmers will participate in conservation programs. 
 
3.2.   Relevant variables identified in the review of literature 
 
 From the mentioned studies, it appears that several variables were recognized as 
being important in determining farmer adoption of conservation practices (Table 3.1 and 
3.2).  Variables on land, farmer, county and community characteristics, as well as net returns 
from farming were recognized from the studies of the literature reviewed that collected 
primary data (Surveys) for analysis (table 3.1).  The most used and relevant variables from 
the land uses category seem to be the number of acres of cultivated land and the farm size.  
From the farmer characteristics list, the age of primary operator, the education attainment, 
outreach, such as extension services, and the source of information a farmer receives for its 
activities, were also relevant in determining farmer adoption of conservation practices. 
 Similarly, literature reviewed indicated that several studies collected and analyzed 
secondary data in order to understand farmers’ participation in conservation programs.  
Variables on land, farmer, community characteristics, and net returns from farming were 
identified (Table 3.2).  Farm size, incentive payments from conservation programs, and the 
land use were the most relevant and used variables.  The separation of studies based on 
primary versus secondary data was made because of the relative difficulty in repeating studies 
with data primary in other areas of the country without the expense and effort to administer 
a survey. 
 The literature reviewed does not address the relationship of the level of cost-share 
funding from government conservation programs, with specific county characteristics, multi-
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program participation, and the Extension Service impact on the programs participation, in 
the Kentucky River Watershed region.  Operator characteristics such education attainment 
and outreach programs seem to help in the adoption of conservation practices, reduce 
transaction costs, alleviate social constraints such as mistrust in regulators and help with 
more permanent and cost-effective solutions.  The age of the primary operator of a farm can 
have either a negative or positive impact in the enrollment of a conservation program.  This 
may occur if the older the operator is, the less likely to adopt a BMP, because the operator 
will be less inclined to plan over a long horizon, and because they may be less aware of the 
new practices.  On the other hand, older producers might have more experience with a wide 
range of practices therefore, therefore, more likely to adopt BMPs.  Larger farms seem to 
have a positive influence in landowner’s opportunity costs of enrollment as well as the 
number of acres of cultivated land.  Farmers with these land uses seem to believe that 
adopting BMPs is a risk-reducing strategy.  The farmers’ source of information is of 
relevance because could provide awareness about the benefits of conservation practices and 
the conservation programs cost-share.  Therefore farmers’ source of information could 
positively impact in the adoption of conservation practices, or impact in the participation of 
conservation programs. 
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Table 3.1. Literature Review - Primary data 
Data 
Categories 
Significant Variables 
  
Land uses # Acres of cultivated land 
% Prime soils 
Farm is contiguous to a preserved land 
Farm size = # Acres 
Having a biological/organic production certificate 
Machinery and equipment 
Minimum Acreage eligibility requirement 
Presence of a stream in the farm 
Soil eligibility requirement 
Total # of cows in the dairy herd (farm size variable) 
Farmers’ 
characteristics 
# Years of family owned farm 
Age of the primary operator 
Child to continue farming 
Gender = Female 
Education attainment 
Membership in an agro-environmental club 
Owning a Farm 
Producers awareness of Govt. regulations to control NPS 
(CWA) 
Risk aversion on technology adoption 
Source of information 
Whether primary residence is on farm 
County 
characteristics 
Distance to the nearest urban area 
Specific County 
Net returns Net Returns from agriculture 
Size/value of animal production 
Low cost-share % offered from EQIP 
Price of labor ($/hour) 
Higher milk yield 
Less than 25% income from farm 
Debt-to-asset ratio less than 20% 
Low cost-share % offered from EQIP 
Community 
characteristics 
Building on existing networks 
Outreach 
Third-party facilitation 
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Table 3.2. Literature Review - Secondary data 
Data 
Categories 
Significant Variables 
Land uses Land slope 
Mean of daily max temperature during growing season 
Mean of daily min temperature during growing season 
Variance of daily precipitation during growing season 
Soil permeability 
Soil available water capacity 
 % of irrigated cropland/county 
Farmers’ 
characteristics 
Operators working off-farm/total county farm operators 
Harvested cropland operated by tenants/total county-harvested 
cropland 
County average farm operator age 
Gender = Male operators/total county farm operators 
Net returns Net returns to conventional tillage of (corn, soybeans and other crops)
Returns to land use 
Expected growth of returns to each land use 
AVG annual incentive per acre offered to farmers 
AVG annualized one-time incentive less cost of enrollment 
Community 
characteristics 
Income/capita 
Population density 
Education attainment 
Unemployment rate 
Republican vote (proportion) 
Voter turnout (proportion) 
Renter households (proportion) 
Urban influence index 
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Chapter 4. Model development 
 
4.1.   Theoretical framework 
 
 In the previous section, several variables that affect the participation and level of 
participation of farmers in conservation programs were identified from the literature.  Farm 
operator participation in a WQT scheme presupposes that the farmers have some positive 
predisposition toward conservation programs.  This predisposition is influenced not only by 
the size of the farm but also by the type of cultivation undertaken.  In a given county, it 
would be expected that the more the number of farms, the more the participation in 
conservation programs.  Counties with larger average farm size would probably have a 
higher level of participation.  The type of farm activities (crops, pasture, silviculture, etc.) 
would also affect the participation, and level of participation in specific programs that are 
targeting certain types of land uses. 
 In this study, explaining the government payments for conservation practices made 
in a county based on land uses is of interest.  It would then be possible to predict if in a 
particular county of this study region, there is farmland with features that would make them 
potentially eligible to participate in a WQT scheme, and also test the interaction between 
different programs with different criteria for land characteristics eligibility.  Information on 
government payments for conservation practices by county could be explained by the 
following equation: 
CRP = β0 + β1 NFarms + β2 AVGFarm + β3 TPCropuse + β4 TPPastureuse + β5 EQIP + 
β6 WHIP + β7 EXTENSION + ε. 
Where the dependent variable CRP consists of direct payments as defined by the 2002 Farm 
Bill made in 2007 to farmers in the Kentucky River Watershed; payments from Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP), Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP), Farmable Wetlands Program 
(FWP), and Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP). 
 The independent variables used in the equation are the number of farms in a county, 
(NFarms), the average farm size per county (AVGFarm), the total percentage of cropland in 
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a county (TPCropuse), the total percentage of pastureland in a county (TPPastureuse), the 
dollar amount of EQIP payments made to farmers per county (EQIP), the dollar amount of 
WHIP payments made to farmers per county (WHIP); and the number of the State of 
Kentucky Extension Service Specialists contacts to farmers per county (EXTENSION).  
The parameter estimates of each explanatory variable are represented respectively by β0 
through β7, and the error term is represented by ε in the equation. 
 The level of government payments for conservation practices is tested to investigate 
whether the counties from the study region, that receive more incentives from those 
programs, tend to receive more EQIP or WHIP payments.  The effect that multiple 
program participation may have on payments could be positive because, information related 
to adoption of some of the programs is available through the same source, the USDA and 
the Kentucky NRCS. 
 The number of farms is also tested to understand if it would positively correlate with 
payments for conservation practices.  One could assume that the more farms adopting a 
program in a given county, the higher the tendency of the information about program 
benefits being quickly spread and adopted.  Also, the average farm size in a county is being 
tested to see if positively correlate with government incentives.  Larger farms with lower 
capital costs and higher managerial ability (Alvarez and Arias, 2003) might be more aware of 
future regulations and are taking advantage of the government benefits offered or more 
specifically, from cost-share incentives of programs that implement conservation practices. 
 The percentage of cropland in a county is also being tested to investigate if tends to 
be positively correlated with government incentives to adopt conservation practices (Lynch 
and Lovell, 2003; Ghazalian et al., 2009).  One could expect that the higher the percentage of 
pastureland in a county, the lower the payments, because most programs are targeted for 
land retirement, rewarding financially conversion of cropland into grasslands or forestlands. 
 Finally, the number of extension contacts, made by the Kentucky State agriculture 
extension specialists, is tested to investigate whether it has an effect on the level of payments 
in a county.  Previous studies have used similar education and outreach measurements that 
have positively contributed to a larger participation in conservation (Breetz et al., 2005; 
Paudel et al., 2008; Rahelizatovo and Gillespie, 2004; Ghazalian et al., 2009). 
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4.2.   The Kentucky River Watershed region 
 
 As mentioned before, the region of study of this research is the Kentucky River 
Watershed (Basin), which comprises the North Fork Kentucky, Middle Fork Kentucky, 
South Fork Kentucky, Upper Kentucky, and Lower Kentucky sub-watersheds (sub-basins) 
with their respective hydrologic unit codes (HUC-8) 05100201, 05100202, 05100203, 
05100204, 05100205.  The Kentucky River Basin (Figure 4.1) extends over much of the 
central and eastern portions of the state.  It includes all or parts of 46 counties and drains 
approximately 7,000 square miles.  One of the state’s fastest growing counties (Madison) and 
one of the most impoverished counties (Owsley) are within the basin.  The Kentucky River 
basin discharges into the Ohio River.  The main stem and tributaries consist of more than 
15,000 miles of stream in 2,032 HUC-14 watersheds.  In 2000, almost 775,000 people lived 
in the basin.  More than 60 municipalities draw water from the Kentucky River. 
 
 The North, Middle, and South Fork Watersheds occupy the mountainous terrain of 
the Eastern Kentucky Coal Field (Figure 4.2).  Sources of pollution within these watersheds 
are often straight pipes and failing septic systems, contamination from runoff in populated 
areas, as well as from logging, mining, and construction activities.  The Upper Kentucky sub 
basin includes the transition from resource extraction to agricultural production.  Sources of 
pollution include straight pipes and failing septic systems, pathogens and nutrients from 
agricultural sources, and siltation from agriculture and construction activities.  The Lower 
Kentucky sub basin includes the most heavily populated regions of the basin including 
Lexington and Frankfort.  Sources of pollution in this sub basin are straight pipes and failing 
septic systems, failing sanitary sewer systems, pathogens and nutrients from agriculture, 
contamination from runoff in heavily settled areas, and siltation from agriculture and 
construction activities.  Between 2000 and 2003, there were more than 17,000 KPDES 
pollution violations on the Kentucky River. 
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Figure 4.2. Kentucky River Watershed 
 According to the 2007 Census of Agriculture, County data, from the USDA, 
National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), in all the counties of the study region there 
are 27,841 farms, which represent 33% of all farms in the State, and 29% of the farmland 
area in the State.  Around 45% of the total area of the Kentucky River watershed is under 
farmland.  From the farmland area, 44% is under crop production and 28% is under pasture, 
almost 23% is under forestland and around 5% represent other types of land uses (Figures 
4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6).  Also according to the 2007 Census of Agriculture, County data, the 
average size of farms in the entire State of Kentucky is around 164, and in the Kentucky 
River watershed is slightly smaller, around 148 acres on average. 
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Figure 4.3. Kentucky River Watershed - Land Uses 
 The diverse characteristics of the Kentucky River basin pose a challenge to a water 
quality trading program, but they could also support an analysis with a rich coverage of 
various buyers and sellers of water quality credits including non-industrial private forest land 
owners, industrial, agricultural, and urban entities. 
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Figure 4.4. Total number of farms 
Figure 4.5. Total farmland acreage 
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Figure 4.6. Kentucky River Watershed percentage of Land uses 
 
4.3.   Descriptive statistics 
 
 To examine which land uses can potentially explain farmers’ participation of certain 
counties in the Kentucky River Watershed in conservation programs, county data from the 
NASS (USDA) 2007 Census of Agriculture of county land uses was associated with data 
from CRP payments made to farmers for each of the 46 counties in the Kentucky River 
Watershed area.  The CRP data obtained from the Census consisted of direct payments from 
CRP, WRP and FWP.  CREP data was not available for the Kentucky River watershed 
region because the program is only being offered to farmers and landowners located in the 
Green River watershed region (KDOC).  According to the data collected, there is a diverse 
range of farm sizes, number of farms, quantity of farmland, and land uses per county in 
relation to total CRP payments received by county, and average CRP payments received per 
farm in a county (Table 4.1).  For example, the counties of Fayette and Jessamine are similar 
in the number of farms, in the percentage of farm acreage and lands uses, but differ in the 
amount of incentives received.  The counties of Lincoln, Madison and Mercer have similar 
cropland percentages but also differ in the amount of incentives received, and differ from 
Breathitt and Pike counties, which have larger acreages of woodland and low number of 
farmers.  The differences around the region in respect of land uses can be important factors 
to be considered when participating in conservation. 
44%
28%
23%
5%
Crop
Pasture
Forest
Other
	
	
35
 In order to understand what relationships exist in multi-program participation of 
farmers in certain counties in the study region, county data of the EQIP and WHIP 
payments made to farmers from year 2006 to 2009 was acquired from the Natural Resources 
Conservation Service (NRCS) through Kentucky State Conservationists.  The information 
obtained combined with the CRP payments reveals differences between the payments of the 
different programs in each county (Table 4.2).  Counties that received the largest payments 
in one of the conservation programs (CRP, EQIP or WHIP) do not necessarily received the 
highest overall amount of payments.  A combination of conservation payments information 
with land uses in each county can help decide where one program (or more) is more 
favorable than other, assessing different needs of each county (Table 4.1 and 4.2). 
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Table 4.1. Kentucky River Watershed land uses in relation to CRP payments 
# Counties County Area (Acres) 
# 
Farms 
Farmland 
(Acres) 
Avg. Farm 
Size (Acres) 
% Farm 
Land 
% Agriculture Land Uses 
CRP Pay-
ments 
Average Per 
Farm CRP Pay-
ments Cropland Pasture Woodland 
Other 
uses 
1 Anderson 130708  678 87,617 129 67.03% 49.83% 25.51% 20.09% 4.57% $18,756.00 $2,084.00 
2 Bell 231161  69 10,194 148 4.41% 40.07% 6.35% 49.12% 4.46% $0.00 $0.00 
3 Boone 164165  682 74,750 110 45.53% 47.92% 21.43% 24.11% 6.54% $5,775.00 $385.00 
4 Bourbon 186585  918 184,323 201 98.79% 46.94% 42.86% 5.11% 5.09% $97,370.00 $1,391.00 
5 Boyle 116885  649 94,233 145 80.62% 49.38% 28.76% 14.92% 6.94% $15,720.00 $1,048.00 
6 Breathitt 316922  199 43,540 219 13.74% 21.58% 10.82% 60.35% 7.25% $1,468.00 $367.00 
7 Carroll 87882  326 63,708 195 72.49% 40.38% 29.66% 26.13% 3.83% $9,630.00 $963.00 
8 Casey 285243  1,286 191,609 149 67.17% 40.64% 21.72% 34.05% 3.60% $66,021.00 $1,119.00 
9 Clark 163273  907 149,201 164 91.38% 46.22% 39.44% 10.34% 4.00% $26,271.00 $973.00 
10 Clay 301514  336 51,194 152 16.98% 29.23% 9.97% 55.12% 9.97% $3,500.00 $700.00 
11 Estill 163559  456 64,780 142 39.61% 34.80% 22.88% 36.73% 5.59% $18,960.00 $1,580.00 
12 Fayette 182713  810 135,969 168 74.42% 45.39% 39.27% 6.93% 8.41% $22,080.00 $920.00 
13 Franklin 135667  625 76,306 122 56.25% 45.74% 26.02% 23.65% 4.59% $5,048.00 $1,262.00 
14 Gallatin 67019  204 33,816 166 50.46% 46.00% 25.00% 21.00% 8.00% $268.00 $67.00 
15 Garrard 149697  821 121,673 148 81.28% 48.49% 35.96% 11.67% 3.88% $15,111.00 $1,679.00 
16 Grant 166848  959 114,965 120 68.90% 45.74% 28.47% 18.34% 7.45% $6,648.00 $554.00 
17 Harlan 299654  37 3,034 82 1.01% 22.74% 12.89% 59.49% 4.88% $0.00 $0.00 
18 Harrison 198294  1,083 161,777 149 81.58% 46.17% 33.70% 14.98% 5.15% $48,960.00 $1,530.00 
19 Henry 186295  962 146,399 152 78.58% 49.68% 25.98% 17.83% 6.51% $21,926.00 $1,154.00 
20 Jackson 221740  662 82,614 125 37.26% 40.80% 20.20% 33.70% 5.30% $6,732.00 $561.00 
21 Jessamine 111679  711 80,116 113 71.74% 47.08% 35.60% 11.04% 6.29% $8,708.00 $1,244.00 
22 Kenton 105564  481 42,544 88 40.30% 50.50% 24.60% 18.70% 6.10% $9,562.00 $1,366.00 
23 Knott 225800  46 6,937 151 3.07% 38.98% 29.42% 30.47% 1.12% $0.00 $0.00 
24 Knox 248184  376 51,115 136 20.60% 34.96% 23.32% 37.88% 3.84% D D 
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Table 4.1. Kentucky River Watershed land uses in relation to CRP payments (Cont.) 
# Counties County Area (Acres) # Farms 
Farmland 
(Acres) 
Avg. Farm 
Size (Acres) 
% Farm 
Land 
% Agriculture Land Uses 
CRP Pay-
ments 
Average Per 
Farm CRP Pay-
ments Cropland Pasture Woodland Other uses 
25 Laurel 283961  1,012 102,489 101 36.09% 42.16% 26.30% 26.38% 5.16% $4,602.00 $354.00 
26 Lee 135182  186 29,419 158 21.76% 31.43% 14.49% 51.28% 2.81% $6,479.00 $589.00 
27 Leslie 258815  23 5,642 245 2.18% 2.73% 20.56% 63.59% 15.85% $0.00 $0.00 
28 Letcher 216977  66 3,617 55 1.67% 20.93% 16.26% 53.14% 9.68% $0.00 $0.00 
29 Lincoln 215379  1,278 178,315 140 82.79% 47.07% 30.66% 18.60% 3.67% $50,820.00 $2,310.00 
30 Madison 283632  1,328 218,194 164 76.93% 49.77% 31.56% 15.28% 3.40% $48,375.00 $1,935.00 
31 Magoffin 197826  470 61,620 131 31.15% 22.53% 20.01% 51.38% 6.07% $1,944.00 $243.00 
32 Menifee 131771  331 43,110 130 32.72% 34.99% 20.87% 40.51% 3.63% $918.00 $306.00 
33 Mercer 162088  1,111 141,437 127 87.26% 52.96% 32.07% 10.52% 4.45% $17,052.00 $406.00 
34 Montgomery 127246  685 106,957 156 84.06% 50.39% 30.40% 13.78% 5.43% $32,800.00 $1,640.00 
35 Morgan 245578  795 136,303 171 55.50% 30.27% 20.95% 41.02% 7.76% $16,422.00 $966.00 
36 Owen 226702  864 157,932 183 69.66% 43.85% 28.59% 22.10% 5.46% $15,582.00 $1,113.00 
37 Owsley 126889  195 35,857 184 28.26% 27.58% 13.87% 50.28% 8.27% $513.00 $171.00 
38 Perry 219255  57 10,661 187 4.86% 22.46% 17.12% 57.34% 3.09% D D 
39 Pike 504678  70 14,228 203 2.82% 21.26% 17.61% 59.72% 1.41% $879.00 $293.00 
40 Powell 115254  236 32,763 139 28.43% 41.27% 15.27% 39.72% 3.74% $6,489.00 $721.00 
41 Rockcastle 203559  727 90,435 124 44.43% 35.89% 20.23% 39.66% 4.23% $16,758.00 $931.00 
42 Scott 182651  930 139,044 150 76.13% 44.99% 33.86% 16.20% 4.95% $7,520.00 $940.00 
43 Shelby 246795  1,651 205,286 124 83.18% 60.50% 19.40% 13.10% 7.00% $99,640.00 $1,880.00 
44 Trimble 99976  489 65,098 133 65.11% 39.75% 20.21% 33.44% 6.61% $14,916.00 $1,243.00 
45 Wolfe 142535  342 57,701 169 40.48% 27.06% 14.88% 52.83% 5.22% $5,980.00 $1,196.00 
46 Woodford 122868  712 119,087 167 96.92% 42.61% 41.52% 8.47% 7.41% $11,136.00 $928.00 
  TOTAL 8,896,668 27,841 4,027,609 148 45.27% 44% 28% 23% 5% $767,339.00 $850.26 
(D) Cannot be disclosed           
Source: USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) - 2007 CENSUS of Agriculture    
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Table 4.2. Kentucky Watershed Conservation payments 
# Counties CRP Payments 
EQIP 
Payments 
WHIP 
Payments 
1 Anderson $18,756.00 $0.00 $4,245.73
2 Bell $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
3 Boone $5,775.00 $140,874.55 $32,621.00
4 Bourbon $97,370.00 $5,158.22 $0.00
5 Boyle $15,720.00 $107,637.87 $0.00
6 Breathitt $1,468.00 $0.00 $5,143.52
7 Carroll $9,630.00 $0.00 $0.00
8 Casey $66,021.00 $159,084.12 $34,781.70
9 Clark $26,271.00 $58,841.83 $0.00
10 Clay $3,500.00 $0.00 $0.00
11 Estill $18,960.00 $57,427.32 $8,620.00
12 Fayette $22,080.00 $70,129.53 $0.00
13 Franklin $5,048.00 $42,929.56 $6,948.20
14 Gallatin $268.00 $0.00 $8,474.17
15 Garrard $15,111.00 $0.00 $4,983.20
16 Grant $6,648.00 $59,469.28 $13,674.50
17 Harlan $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
18 Harrison $48,960.00 $264,772.68 $50,136.58
19 Henry $21,926.00 $109,988.19 $37,393.00
20 Jackson $6,732.00 $185,492.33 $0.00
21 Jessamine $8,708.00 $82,897.82 $0.00
22 Kenton $9,562.00 $116,546.01 $28,470.00
23 Knott $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
24 Knox D $21,719.00 $1,896.40
25 Laurel $4,602.00 $0.00 $0.00
26 Lee $6,479.00 $113,257.32 $0.00
27 Leslie $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
28 Letcher $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
29 Lincoln $50,820.00 $0.00 $4,436.00
30 Madison $48,375.00 $27,369.04 $4,968.21
31 Magoffin $1,944.00 $0.00 $0.00
32 Menifee $918.00 $214,315.16 $3,432.66
33 Mercer $17,052.00 $293,034.98 $0.00
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Table 4.2. Kentucky Watershed Conservation payments (Cont.) 
# Counties CRP Payments 
EQIP 
Payments 
WHIP 
Payments 
34 Montgomery $32,800.00 $36,928.22 $0.00
35 Morgan $16,422.00 $0.00 $3,415.25
36 Owen $15,582.00 $22,115.74 $36,113.28
37 Owsley $513.00 $10,483.67 $0.00
38 Perry D $0.00 $0.00
39 Pike $879.00 $9,212.41 $0.00
40 Powell $6,489.00 $0.00 $0.00
41 Rockcastle $16,758.00 $7,806.99 $0.00
42 Scott $7,520.00 $9,927.99 $0.00
43 Shelby $99,640.00 $105,251.75 $9,414.00
44 Trimble $14,916.00 $11,453.00 $0.00
45 Wolfe $5,980.00 $28,493.87 $7,759.00
46 Woodford $11,136.00 $100,991.93 $0.00
  TOTAL $767,339.00 $2,473,610.38 $306,926.40
(D) Cannot be disclosed 
Source: USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) - 2007 CENSUS of 
Agriculture; USDA KY NRCS. 
 Data from the Kentucky NRCS was also collected on what conservation practices 
are being used by EQIP and WHIP program adopters, in the counties of the Kentucky River 
Watershed region, and their relative efficiency towards surface and groundwater quality.  The 
data on the relative efficiency towards water quality, have a scale that ranges from -3 to 5, 
where smaller numbers (-3, -2 and -1) represent that certain practices can have negative 
impacts to the quality of the water than the practices represented with higher numbers.  
Conversely, the practices with higher numbers (1, 2, 3, 4 and 5) show that certain practices 
can have greater benefits to water quality, and a 0 (zero) value shows that a practice being 
use does not interfere with the current water quality.  Therefore, the smaller the number is, 
in the water quality efficiency scale for a conservation practice used, the worse the practice is 
to water quality.  Moreover, the higher the number is, the better the practice is for water 
quality. 
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 The EQIP and WHIP conservation practices are represented in respect of their 
water quality efficiency to abate N and P pollution (Tables 4.3 and 4.4).  Table 4.3 shows 
EQIP and WHIP conservation practices estimated groundwater efficiency, and Table 4.4 
represents estimated surface water efficiency.  In both tables an overall efficiency was 
calculated summing the entire efficiency ranking in the rows of each practice.  An estimate 
of the overall number of efficiency helps to identify what practices are more suitable for N 
and P abatement on both ground and surface water.  The conservation practices Riparian 
Forest Buffer, Filter Strip, Conservation Cover and Nutrient Management seem to be the 
most indicated in order to abate N and P for both ground and surface water.  In the case of 
surface water, the practices Access Control, Prescribed Grazing, Critical Area Planting and 
Grassed Waterway also appear to have a relative good performance.  
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However, when comparing the overall efficiency of the practices funded by EQIP 
and WHIP, with the amounts of cost-share from the programs’ payments made to farmers, 
and the number of times each practice was funded for the period of time the data is 
representing (Tables 4.5 and 4.6), most of the EQIP and WHIP funding is directed towards 
less efficient conservation practices in abating N and P, and this is true for both groundwater 
and surface water quality.  This is because technical complementarities among practices.  For 
example, watering facilities may not directly contribute to the reduction of pollution but if 
used as complements to other practices could help reduce livestock access to streams, which 
can increase concentrations of bacteria, suspended sediments and associated N and P 
contaminants.  Tables 4.5 and 4.6 also show the conservation practices funded by EQIP and 
WHIP, separated in categories that are related to the different land uses observed in the 2007 
Census of Agriculture county data for the total study region.  The top funded and the more 
frequent funded practices are related to pastureland use, also the majority of the incentives 
are towards practices that impact conservation in pastureland use. 
 In addition, estimated unit costs of each practice were added to the analysis (Tables 
4.5 and 4.6).  Since the majority of EQIP and WHIP incentives cover 75% of these costs, 
these are the minimum amounts to be considered for possible trading prices.  For example, 
if a farmer intends to reduce N and P pollution adopting a Filter Strip conservation practice, 
she will be facing a cost of $417.93 per acre, but she will receive 75% of the cost ($313.45) as 
an incentive if she had applied for WHIP or EQIP. 
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In conclusion, for a potential WQT, the practices to be investigated in order to 
reduce NPS N and P pollution are the ones with the best performance of abatement cited 
above.  However, technical complementarities will have to be considered, as well as the costs 
of each practice.  Considering the costs of each practice, the amounts of cost-share being 
offered by EQIP and WHIP will be required for a potential trading scheme. 
 Data was also collected from the Kentucky Cooperative Extension System reports 
from the University of Kentucky, College of Agriculture, in the number of extension 
contacts made by Kentucky state agriculture extension specialists from 2007 to 2009, in 
order to test if it has an effect on the level of government and CRP payments in a county.  
This information is used as a proxy in education and as measurement of outreach that might 
positively contribute to a larger participation in conservation. 
 Based in the 46 counties from the Kentucky River Watershed region, the 
information collected to test if land uses, multi-program participation, and the number of 
extension contacts made by extension specialists and its relationships with the CRP 
payments in a county offered significant insights (Figures 4.7 and 4.8, and Table 4.7).  The 
average value of CRP payment per county was US$19,675.36, while the EQIP average 
payment per county was US$53,774.14 and the WHIP average payment per county was 
US$6,672.31. 
Table 4.7. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CRP Payments (US$)  19,675.36  24,043.65  268.00  99,640.00  
# Farms  605.24  403.97  23.00  1,651.00  
Avg. farm size (acres)  148.15  35.25  55.00  245.00  
% Pasture Land  0.14  0.12  0.00  0.42  
% Crop Land  0.22  0.16  -   0.50  
EQIP Payments (US$)  53,774.14  74,259.00  -   293,034.98  
WHIP Payments (US$)  6,672.31  12,403.89  -   50,136.58  
# Extension contacts  13,393.59  14,508.19  -   92,248.00  
N = 46 Counties         
Source: Cooperative Extension Service; NASS; FSA; USDA Kentucky NRCS 
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Figure 4.7. Kentucky River Watershed Conservation payments 
 The land uses in the study region differ from the average farmland uses of each 
county, only 22% of the total is farmland, and 14% of the total land is under pasture.  
Forests must characterize most of the land in the region, as well the mountainous terrain 
from the Eastern side of the state and the urban areas.  On the other hand, the average farm 
size of the study region, at about 148 acres, is very similar throughout the state, which is 
around 164 acres on average.  And finally, the number of contacts made by extension 
specialists to farmers totals 13,393.59 on average by county from the period of the years 
2007 to 2009. 
21%
70% 9%
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Figure 4.8. Land Uses 
 The study region has different dispersion of land uses than the state.  Studying the 
specific area of the Kentucky Watershed rather than the entire State of Kentucky, helps 
understand the peculiarities of communities of important stakeholders in a possible WQT 
system in this particular region.  Aggregating information of land uses, information of 
different programs participation, and information about education and outreach in the 
Kentucky Watershed, is crucial.  This aggregation of relevant information of this particular 
region, leads to a series of analysis through an empirical model discussed in the following 
section, with the intention of providing a comprehensive view in the participation in 
conservation. 
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Chapter 5. Model estimation results 
 
 In order to identify a relationship of the level of CRP payments made to farmers in 
each of the counties from our study region, with land uses, multi-program participation and 
the Kentucky extension service, the payments were regressed on number of farms per 
county, average farm size per county, percentage of cropland per county, percentage of 
pastureland per county, EQIP payments per county, WHIP payments per county, and on the 
total number of extension contacts made by KY state extension specialists on farmers 
located on the study region. 
 The model for the equation previously presented is given by: 
CRP = β0 + β1 NFarms + β2 AVGFarm + β3 TPCropuse + β4 TPPastureuse + β5 EQIP + 
β6 WHIP + β7 EXTENSION + ε. 
Estimation results of the OLS model for the equation on CRP payments are presented in 
table 5.1. 
Table 5.1. OLS Estimation Results 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. 
Constant -63,686.000*** 19,383.00
# Farms 44.804*** 12.46311
Avg. farm size (acres) 300.919*** 110.82851
% Pasture Land 80015.000 55,971.00
% Crop Land -80604.000 61,539.00
EQIP Payments (US$) 0.005 0.04088
WHIP Payments (US$) -0.022 0.2329
# Extension contacts -0.011 0.18999
Adj. R2 0.544 -
F-Value 7.470*** -
*, **, and *** indicate significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels 
respectively. 
Sources: Cooperative Extension Service; NASS; FSA; USDA Kentucky NRCS 
 The adjusted R2 for the tested model is .544, therefore 54% of the variation in CRP 
payments is explained by number of farms per county, average farm area, percentage of 
cropland per county, percentage of pastureland per county, the level of EQIP payments per 
county, the level of WHIP payments per county, and the total number of extension contacts 
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made by KY state extension specialists.  On the other hand, almost 46% of the variation in 
CRP payments is not explained by the independent variables.  The F-test shows that the 
model is significant at 1% level. 
 Based on the regression analysis the results show that, the average numbers of farms 
per county and average farm size per county of the study region have a positive relationship 
with the participation in the CRP.  If two counties from this study region have the same 
average farm size per county, percentage of cropland per county, percentage of pastureland 
per county, EQIP payments per county, WHIP payments per county, and total number of 
extension contacts made by KY state extension specialists, but the number of farms of one 
of the counties has one more farm than the other, one can predict that that the county with 
one more farm to have a CRP payment $44.80 higher than the county with one less farm.  In 
addition, holding all other independent variables fixed, if the average farm size of a county 
increases by one acre, then the CRP payment is projected to increase by $300.92.  Thus, 
counties with more farms, and larger farms, tend to be more responsive to CRP incentives.  
This result can be explained because CRP sets aside crop acreage as conservation measure. 
 When comparing the relationship between the land uses, multi-program participation, 
and the community characteristic of the extension service in the participation of counties in 
the CRP payments, no significance was found.  One may expect to find some level of 
significance on such variables given the findings observed in the studies from the literature 
reviewed.  One of the reasons for finding insignificant results is the possibility of time lag 
between the number of contacts made by extension service specialists and the conservation 
payments being made during similar period.  This can be solved by acquiring older periods 
of data on extension contacts from the Kentucky Cooperative Extension service.  
Furthermore, one would expect that education and outreach information, delivered from the 
extension services, would demand more time to be spread and absorbed by communities 
targeted before the action of engaging in conservation programs, or that maybe farmers 
already had exposure to these programs from extension.  Therefore, further exploration with 
different education attainment maybe justified, because additional information from 
extension services on conservation programs would not be relevant to the adoption decision. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusions 
 
 There are 1,217 PS of pollution in the Kentucky River Watershed, and 1477.2 river 
miles affected by agricultural sources of pollution discharge.  With 27,841 farms the 
Kentucky River Watershed has 33% of all farms in the State, and 29% of the farmland area 
in the State.  Around 45% of the total area of the Kentucky River watershed is under 
farmland.  From the farmland area, 44% is under crop production and 28% is under pasture, 
almost 23% is under forestland and around 5% represent other types of land uses.  The 
average size of farms in the region is slightly smaller than the state’s average. 
 The diverse characteristics of the Kentucky River basin pose a challenge for a water 
quality trading program, but they could also support an analysis with a rich coverage of 
various buyers and sellers of water quality credits including non-industrial private forest land 
owners, industrial, agricultural, and urban entities.  The Kentucky River Watershed has 
different dispersion of land uses than the state, enforcing the idea of studying the specific 
area of the Kentucky Watershed rather than the entire State of Kentucky, which helps 
understand the peculiarities of communities and important stakeholders in a possible WQT. 
 To achieve an efficient reduction of N and P pollution required by regulations, the 
installation of BMPs and/or development of nutrient management plans by sources of 
pollution can create permits for pollution emissions that could be traded with less efficient 
sources of pollution.  The product to be traded on the proposed market will be the over 
control generated by sellers.  WQT schemes can be an alternative to conservation programs 
that cannot cover specific pollution standards.  The involvement of stakeholders is one of 
the primary objectives for the success in the development of WQT schemes, which not only 
have the potential to reduce costs of compliance from regulations, but also reduce farmers’ 
dependency on government financial assistance. 
 However, literature on trading alert that during the last 20 years that these 
mechanisms are being applied the results of the WQT initiatives including NPS are mixed, if 
not negative.  It was found that the main barriers for the participation of farmers are the lack 
of awareness of these systems, the lack of science, and no trust in program administrators 
(Breetz et al., 2005).  When approached with the ideas of WQT, farmers fear they will lose 
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autonomy in their farm operations, they also fear increased government oversight, and they 
may resent the fact of being portrayed as polluters, because they view themselves as stewards 
of the land and that they have a strong conservation ethic.  Farmers also express their 
resentment towards urbanities.  They were reluctant to participate in some WQT programs 
involving municipalities because they perceived their participation as an indirect way to fund 
urban growth (Breetz et al., 2005).  
 Understanding the factors that influence participation in voluntary programs is 
important when evaluating existing programs and determining new conditions for those 
programs, as well as when developing new programs.  Several studies were identified using 
primary data of land uses such as soil eligibility, farms’ characteristics such as farm size, 
county characteristics such as being near to an urban area, net returns from agriculture, or 
community characteristics such as education, that explain behavior towards adoption of 
conservation practices.  Therefore, farmland uses as well as community characteristics are 
relevant if one wants to determine the probability that farmers will participate in 
conservation programs. 
 From the studies that used secondary data to investigate conservation adoption 
through BMPs, significant factors and features were found that affect participation in 
voluntary programs towards conservation.  Within the most relevant factors, are the farmers’ 
characteristics, such the age of farmer operator, the land characteristics, such as soil and 
climate, the net returns from farm and land use, and the community characteristics, such as 
education attainment and population density. 
 Based on the findings from the literature, this study tested the relationships between 
CRP participation, with number of farms per county, average farm size per county, 
percentage of cropland per county, percentage of pastureland per county, EQIP payments 
per county, WHIP payments per county, and on the total number of extension contacts 
made by KY state extension specialists on farmers located in the study region. 
 From the results of this study, one could expect more participation in a trading 
scheme from some counties than others.  Counties with more farms and larger farms will 
probably have higher rates of participation in conservation programs, since programs like the 
CRP set aside crop acreage for land conservation. 
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 Relevant variables identified in previous studies that used secondary data on 
conservation adoption, one can specify an equation that includes factors that influence CRP 
participation, and conclude that in fact, farmers from certain counties respond to monetary 
incentives if the right compensation for their opportunity costs is offered.  One could also 
think that, farmers of specific counties can indeed be aware of possible penalties if they do 
not comply with the mandate of the Agricultural Water Quality Act.  Moreover, due to the 
increases of food commodity, prices the overall costs of conservation programs, such the 
EQIP, will rise in order to maintain the level of contracts.  Perhaps, with fears of not being 
able to benefit much longer from government cost-share programs, that target standards to 
reduce pollution, farmers are taking advantage of those programs to reduce their costs of 
compliance with pollution abatement.  Trading schemes that prove to be less costly could be 
an alternative to some of the incentives these programs provide. 
 To define a model that would explain participation in a Water Quality Trading 
scheme, in the Kentucky River watershed, is necessary to obtain farm level information.  
Farm level information could be obtained from a survey conducted to farmers that would 
ask their willingness to participate in such a scheme.  A survey will also be important to 
determine the price at which PS of pollution will want to trade with the NPS of pollution, 
and the NPS will want to trade with PS, if PS has interest in engaging farmers to abate 
pollution.  Other than land use features, as previous studies revealed, farmer characteristics 
such the age of primary operator, education attainment, the source of information a farmer 
receives for its agriculture activities, farm income, farm net returns are some examples of 
factors that can also be crucial in targeting important stakeholders in a WQT, and could be 
included in a survey. 
 Accordingly to conservation practices costs of implementation, the cost-share 
amounts being paid by government programs have to be considered for policy makers and 
program administrators as the minimum staring point to negotiate in a trading scheme.  In 
fact, to target the problem of excess of N and P, and the impact of watersheds such as the 
Kentucky River in the Mississippi system, that discharges significant quantities of these 
pollutants into the Gulf of Mexico, policy makers and program administrators should be 
advising and stimulating the adoption of practices with the best abatement performance for 
such pollutants.  For example, riparian forest buffers, filter strips, conservation covers and 
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nutrient management seem to be the most indicated in the Kentucky River Watershed.  
Moreover, practices should be suggested considering technical complementarities between 
other practices. 
 Finally, there is satisfactory information with the analysis drawn in this study, about 
several relationships between agricultural governmental cost-share programs, land uses, farm 
characteristics, information captured from secondary data on costs of BMPs and its relative 
efficiency, and with the addition of PS information on their location, the amounts of permits 
given by authorities for the right to pollute, and with the help of GIS models, that will be 
helpful to do more reliable inferences on the feasibility of a WQT.  For example, given the 
land uses of each county and the location of the PS, it will be possible to identify areas where 
there are enough NPS and PS to create a market for tradable permits of N and P pollution.  
This information could be also used to even discard certain locations because of the risk of 
creating hot spots given the location of the polluters. 
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